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Ambiguity Killed the CFAA
Prakash S. Patel
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (hereinafter “CFAA”) was originally enacted in
1984 to impose criminal penalties on hackers who attacked vulnerable computer systems by
uploading threatening programs such as logic bombs, trapdoors, Trojan horses, viruses and
worms. 1 The original 1984 law was criticized because it was narrowly tailored to cover only
government computers and those involved in the operation of financial institutions. 2 As a result,
Congress amended the language contained in the CFAA to also include non-government
computers if they fall into the category of “protected computer[s].”3 A “protected computer” is
defined as any computer:
exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government,
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a
financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting
the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government;
or which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner
that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
States.4
Since the Internet is frequently used in interstate and foreign commerce, any computer or other
electronic devices connected to the Internet become a “protected computer” under the amended
CFAA definition.5 Home computers that are solely used to watch videos and simple emailing,
however, may not be considered “protected computers” since those activities are not used in
1

Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal
Court, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 155, 160 (2008).
2
Mary M. Calkins, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory
Models, 89 Geo. L. J. 171, 179 (2000).
3
Id. at 180.
4
18 U.S.C.S 1030 §§ 1030(e)(2)(A)-(B)(emphasis added).
5
Liccardi, supra note 1, at 160.

interstate commerce. Employers have taken advantage of this significant change by bringing
civil actions against disloyal employees who obtained confidential data from their computer
systems.6 In these situations, the CFAA is not the only weapon in an employer’s arsenal since
they may also bring a traditional trade secret claim under state law or the Federal statute. 7
Nevertheless, the CFAA is proving to be increasingly popular because the employer only needs
to show that the employee accessed a computer system without or in excess of authorization and
do not require that the employee actually obtained any information.8 Part I of this article will
give a short background on traditional state trade secret law to elicit why the CFAA is the
preferred route for most litigants. Part II of this article analyzes the benefits and limitations of
the CFAA in the context of civil claims and how it has been applied to classic employee
misappropriation cases. Additionally, Part II analyzes CFAA issues in more recent cases
involving social network site—MySpace. Finally, Part III discusses a consistent way courts can
resolve the ambiguity in the CFAA.
I.

Traditional State Trade Secret Law

Today, nearly all the states in the United States have laws that protect trade
secrets.9 Most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) as the basis for
trade secret misappropriation causes of action.10 However, many states have also adopted trade
secret laws from the Restatement (First) of Torts as well as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition. The UTSA and the Restatements both provide a definition of trade secret that is

6

Thomas E. Booms, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 543, 550 (2011).
7
Liccardi, supra note 1, at 158.
8
Id. at 157.
9
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (Rev. 4th ed. 2007).
10
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-659 (2005); 14 U.L.A. 18-19 (Supp.
2008) (listing the forty-seven jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA).

essentially the same: a trade secret is information used in a party’s business that derives
economic value from its secrecy.11 Whether information constitutes a trade secret is, in some
states, a question of fact for the jury to decide.12 In other states the question of whether the
plaintiff’s information constitutes a trade secret is a mixed question of law and fact.13
A plaintiff must prove three essential elements in a state trade secret misappropriation
claim.14 First, the plaintiff must show the information qualifies as a “trade secret” under the
relevant state’s definition of a trade secret.15 Second, the plaintiff must show he made a
reasonable effort to preserve the secrecy of the information.16 Third, the plaintiff must show the
defendant procured the trade secret through unlawful means.17
In order for the plaintiff to prevail on the first element he must demonstrate that the
information qualifies as a trade secret by showing it meets the state’s definition of a trade secret.
UTSA defines a trade secret as information including “a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique or process, that derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and that is

11

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (“’Trade Secret’ means
information…that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons....”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §39 (“A trade secret is any information…that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual
or potential economic advantage over others.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. b (“A trade secret
may consist of…information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”).
12
See Penalty Kick Management Ltd. V. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003); United Group of Nat.
Paper Distributors, Inc. v. Vinson, 666 So. 2d 1338 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 679 So. 2d 1358 (La.
1996).
13
See S & W Agency, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 959 (N.D. Iowa 1998); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v.
McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Mediacom Iowa, L.L.C. v. Incorporated City of Spencer, 682 N.W.2d
62 (Iowa 2004).
14
MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 37.
15
Id.
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Id.
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Id.

the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”18 In a
state that follows the UTSA, the plaintiff must satisfy all the elements of the UTSA test. The
Restatement (First) of Torts lists several factors that courts may consider when determining
whether a plaintiff’s information is protectable as a trade secret.19 Those factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the plaintiff’s]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in [the plaintiff’s] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by [the
plaintiff] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to [the plaintiff’s business] and to [the plaintiff’s] competitors; (5)
the amount of effort or money expended by [the plaintiff] in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others.20
None of these factors are outcome determinative and instead they are common law
factors that are instructive guidelines to help courts determine whether a trade secret
exists under state law.21 Thus, the Restatement offers a more indeterminate balancing
test whereas the UTSA offers more prescriptive requirements.
Both the UTSA and the Restatement (First) of Torts also require the plaintiff to
have made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information deemed to be a
trade secret.22 What constitutes “reasonable efforts” to maintain secrecy varies
depending on the circumstance, the size of the company, and its economic resources.23
After proving the first two elements, the last element requires the plaintiff to show
that the defendant misappropriated the trade secret in an unlawful or wrongful way.

18

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
20
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); See also Weigh Systems South, Inc. v. Mark’s Scales
& Equipment, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 299 (Ark. 2002).
21
E.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).
22
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (including “the extent of measures taken by [the plaintiff] to guard the secrecy of the
information” among the six factors used to determine whether information is a trade secret).
23
See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991) (defining the meaning of
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy based on an economic analysis); Elmer Miller, Inc. v. Landis, 625 N.E.2d
338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy are different for a small entity than
they are for a larger entity).
19

Pursuing a claim under traditional state trade secret claims is not an easy endeavor.
Trade secret claims may be denied when plaintiff fails to establish that the information
was indeed a “trade secret” in contemplation of the law. Furthermore, trade secret claims
may be dismissed on the basis for failure to preserve the secrecy of the information.
Therefore, many plaintiffs prefer to sue in Federal court under the CFAA because it
lowers the burdens of pleading and proof compared to state trade secret laws.24

II.

The Very Poorly Drafted Federal Statute: The CFAA

Congress originally intended the CFAA would be exclusively a criminal statute in order
to protect confidential information stored on computers belonging to the United States
government and financial institutions.25 In 1994, however, Congress amended the CFAA to add a
civil remedy to compensate for the monetary damage caused by criminal violations.26
The CFAA’s civil remedy offers corporations and small businesses significant benefits
against disloyal employees. First, the CFAA allows federal courts to hear cases under federal
question jurisdiction without having employers to show the parties’ diversity of citizenship.27
Federal court is preferred for more complex trade secret litigation because it provides procedural
benefits such as nationwide service of process.28 This procedural benefit cannot be downplayed
because often in complex trade secret litigation the plaintiff resides in one state, the defendant
resides in a different state, and both the evidence of trade secret theft and key witnesses are in
different states around the country. Litigating this complex type of case in state court might
require filing motions and proceedings in multiple jurisdictions throughout the country in order

24

Elizabeth A. Cordello, Commentary: Split Over Unauthorized Use Remains, Daily Rec. (Rochester, N.Y.), Nov.
16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23220555 (“Aside from obtaining federal jurisdiction, the CFAA also is an
attractive means to pursue former employees in non-compete or trade secret litigation because employers do not
have to show the existence of an employment agreement, or that the disputed information is confidential.”).
25
Id. at 160.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 156.
28
Id.

to depose key witnesses and obtain relevant evidence.29 Nationwide service of process avoids
this entire situation and saves substantial amounts of time.30 Second, once in federal court,
litigants may attach one or more state law claims for trade secret misappropriation under the
federal courts supplemental jurisdiction.31 Third, the pleading standards under the CFAA are
much easier to meet then those of state trade secret claims.32 Under state law, a plaintiff must
prove that the misappropriated information constitutes a “trade secret”.33 While this may not be a
significant hurdle in most instances, there is no such requirement under the CFAA, where the
plaintiff must simply prove that the accessed information resided on a “protected computer”.
The last and most distinct advantage of the CFAA is that it protects all intangible computer data
regardless of whether it is proven a trade secret under state law.34
While trade secret litigation can be very complex so can understanding the provisions of
the CFAA. Under the current version of the statute, an insider of the company such as an
employee or outsider such as a hacker may be civilly liable if he “knowingly causes the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result such conduct,
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer,” or if an outsider
“intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization,” and as a result, “recklessly
causes damage” or negligently “causes damage.”35

29

See Roy E. Hofer & Susan F. Gullotti, Presenting the Trade Secret Owner’s Case in Protecting Trade Secrets
1985, at 145, 160-61 (PLI patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 196,
1985), available at WL, 196 PLI/Pat 145.
30
Id.
31
Liccardi, supra note 1, at 157.
32
Id. at 156.
33
See generally, Rockwell Graphic Sys., v. Dev Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
34
Id.
35
Calkins, supra note 2, at 160.

The CFAA provides corporations and small businesses six civil causes of action against
insiders or outsiders who misappropriate confidential information. A insider or outsider may be
civilly liable if he or she:
1. “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution…,”36 or
2. “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any protected
computer,”37 or
3. “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of
the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and
the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;”38 or
4. “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage
without authorization, to a protected computer;”39 or
5. “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a
result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage;”40 or
6. “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a
result of such conduct causes damage and loss.”41
The CFAA provides civil relief in the form of compensatory damages or injunctive relief
to any person who suffers damage or loss.42 In order to get civil relief, a litigant must satisfy a
two part test. First, the party must prove there is a violation of the CFAA giving rise to one of

36

Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
38
Id. § 1030(a)(4).
39
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
40
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
41
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
42
Id. § 1030(g).
37

the six causes of action enumerated in the statute resulting in damage or loss.43 Second, the
violation must involve at least one of the following aggravating factors, which includes:
I.

loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an
investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United
States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or
more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;44 or

II.

the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment,
of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more
individuals;45 or

III.

physical injury to any person;46 or

IV.

a threat to public health or safety;47 or

V.

damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States
Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national
defense, or national security;48 or

VI.

damage affecting 10 or more protected computers during any 1-year
period.49

Notwithstanding the convoluted nature of the CFAA’s provisions, it is proving to be a
powerful weapon for the protection of electronic data stored on computers and cell phones.50
Despite some clear advantage to state trade secret law, courts are sharply divided whether to
interpret the CFAA provisions and key terms broadly or narrowly. The scope and demeanor of
this interpretation, moreover, is both outcome determinative of the breadth and application of the
CFAA.

43

Liccardi, supra note 1, at 162.
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
45
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II).
46
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(III).
47
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV).
48
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(V).
49
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI).
50
Liccardi, supra note 1, at 162.
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III.

The Broad, Narrow, and Contract-Based Approaches in Interpreting
“Authorization”

The focal point of many federal court decisions are on the terms “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access.”51 Federal courts are currently split in determining whether to
apply a broad view, narrow view, or a contract-based approach to these two terms.52 The broad
view rests on principles of agency law.53 It asserts that when an employee has authorization but
then misuses or steals confidential computer data, he acts contrary to his employer’s interest and
therefore loses authorization.54 The narrow view can be characterized as an objective approach.55
It reasons that an employee who is given permission to access an employer’s computer retains
that permission even if the employee misappropriates company data thereafter. 56 Courts have
also adopted the contract-based approach that relies on the existent of an explicit or implied
contract that defines the user’s authorization.57 This latter approach is useful in situations where
there is an express contract, such as between an employer and an employee, or between a website
user and the website’s operating terms of service agreements outlining what is and is not
authorized.58
A. Review of the Broad View and its Criticisms
The seminal case Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.,59 was
the first to expressly adopt the broad interpretation of the CFAA. In Shurgard, both the plaintiff

51

Booms, supra note 6, at 551.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 552.
56
Id.
57
See generally Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp 2d 435, 439-40 (N.D. Tex. 2004);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
58
Id.
59
119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
52

and defendant were direct competitors in the self-storage business.60 Plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was hiring away key employees to obtain the plaintiff’s trade secrets.61 The defendant
offered a job to Eric Leland, a manager for Shurguard, and before officially leaving Shurgard’s
employment, Mr. Leland sent emails to the defendant regarding trade secrets and confidential
information belonging to the plaintiff.62 The plaintiff sued under various provisions of the
CFAA, including § 1030(a)(2)(C), which prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer without
authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing]…information from any
protected computer.”63 The defendant sought a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
plaintiff did not allege that Mr. Leland accessed the information without authorization.64 The
district court adopted the plaintiff’s agency theory, relying upon the Second Restatement of
Agency, which essentially states “the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of
the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of
loyalty to the principal.”65 The court held that even though Mr. Leland was initially authorized,
he lost that authorization when he allegedly obtained and sent the proprietary information to the
defendant via e-mail.66 The Shurgard court’s agency approach interpreting the term
“authorization” quickly spread to other district courts.67
Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit solidified Shurgard’s agency theory by adopting it in
the case International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.68 In Citrin, the defendant was an

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 1123.
63
Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
64
Shurgard, F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
65
Id. at 1125 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)).
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., George S. May Int’l Co. v. Hostetler, No. 04 C 1606, 2004 WL 1197395, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2004);
HUB Grp., Inc. v. Clancy, No. Civ. A. 05-2046, 2006 WL 208684, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2006); Int’l Sec. Mgmt.
Grp., Inc. v. Sawyer, No. 3:06CV0456, 2006 WL 1638537, at *20-21 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2006).
68
440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
61

employee of International Airport Centers (“IAC”) who decided to leave the company to go into
work for himself.69 IAC had given the defendant a company laptop for work.70 Prior to leaving
IAC, the defendant installed a “secure-erasure” program on the company laptop and deleted all
of the data belonging to IAC for which there were no duplicates.71 Judge Posner relied on
agency principles and cited Shurgard as authority to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the
action under the CFAA.72 Judge Posner held that since the defendant “resolved to destroy files
that incriminated himself and other files that were also the property of [IAC] his employer, in
violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes,” his authorization to use the company
laptop had terminated and he was in violation of the CFAA.73
A central problem with the expansive interpretation of the term authorization in the civil
context is that it has also expanded interpretation of other terms in the CFAA that would also
broaden criminal liability for defendants.74 For example, in Citrin, a central issue was whether
the defendant “knowingly cause[d] the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization, to
a protected computer.75 The defendant argued that simply erasing a file from a computer is not a
“transmission.”76 Judge Posner agreed in dicta by stating “[p]ressing a delete or erase key in fact
transmits a command, but it might be stretching the statute too far (especially since it provides
criminal as well as civil sanctions for its violation) to consider any typing on a computer

69

Id. at 419.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 420.
73
Id. at 420.
74
Warren Thomas, Lenity on me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization
and Solving the Split Over the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 379, 380-81 (2011).
75
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419 (citing 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added)).
76
Id.
70

keyboard to be a form of “transmission” just because it transmits a command to the computer.77
If such broad interpretations of terms such as transmission or authorization remain unchecked,
they could cause chaos among litigants and threaten defendants with greater criminal and civil
liability then the CFAA contemplated.78
Another problem with reading agency principles into the CFAA is that employers will
always have a federal cause of action whenever employees access the company computer with so
called “adverse interests.” Employees routinely use “protected computers” throughout their
workday to check personal email, weather, or fantasy football and under the broad view if these
activities are done without permission and inadvertently cause damage, it may give rise to CFAA
liability. Moreover, the broad construction of the CFAA will place an undue administrative
burden on federal courts because it will force them to resolve disputes brought by employers
against employees, suits traditionally in the province of state courts, which also seem too
implicate the state more so than federal interests.
B. The Narrow View and its Criticisms.
While Shurgard, Citrin, and their progeny have applied a broad application of the term
“without authorization”, other courts have applied a more narrow interpretation. In Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Speed79 the court was not persuaded by the analysis in either Citrin or Shurgard
and instead chose to narrowly interpret the term “without authorization.”80 The plaintiff,
Lockheed Martin Corporation, filed suit against three former employees who allegedly copied
confidential and proprietary information before resigning from their positions and accepting
employment at a rival defense contractor who was conspiring to gain an unfair advantage over
77

Id.
Id.
79
No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
80
Id. at *4 (“Both cases rely heavily on extrinsic materials, particularly the Second Restatement of Agency (Citrin
and Shurgard) and legislative history (Shurgard), to derive the meaning of “without authorization”).
78

Lockheed to get bids for an Air Force contract.81 Lockheed essentially alleged that the former
employees knowingly and with the intent to defraud accessed a protected computer without
authorization or by exceeding their authorization and obtained anything of value worth more
than $5,000 and recklessly caused damage.82 Lockheed attempted to argue, as in Citrin and
Shurgard, that the employees terminated their authority when they accessed confidential data
with intent to steal and deliver the data to a competitor.83 The court refused to adopt the agency
theory and instead relied on the “plain language” of the CFAA84 and essentially grouped
employees in three categories: (i) employees acting with authorization; (ii) employees acting
without authorization; and (iii) employees who exceed their authorization.85 Applying a plain
dictionary definition of authorization, the court held the “employees accessed with
authorization”86 and did not exceed their authorization because Lockheed had given the
employees permission to access the company computer for the precise data at issue.87
A federal district court in Maryland in the case International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda followed the reasoning in Speed.88 In that case,
defendant Werner-Masuda, the Secretary-Treasurer of a Local Chapter of the plaintiff Union had
signed an agreement that gave her access to the Union’s online membership database.89 The
defendant later gave confidential membership information to the Union of Independent Flight
81

Id. at *1.
Id.
83
Id. at *4.
84
Id. at *5.
85 Id. ([I]t is plain from the outset that Congress singled out two groups of accessers, those “without authorization”
(or those below authorization, meaning those having no permission to access whatsoever-typically outsiders, as well
as insiders that are not permitted any computer access) and those exceeding authorization (or those above
authorization, meaning those that go beyond the permitted access granted to them-typically insiders exceeding
whatever access is permitted to them).
86 Id. (Specifically, defendant Speed had “complete access,” defendant Fleming had “unrestricted access,” and
defendant St. Romain had “access’ to the files).
87
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
88
390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 2005).
89
Id. at 483.
82

Attendants (“UIFA”) which was competing against the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”).90 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the
CFAA because she exceeded her authorization under her signed agreement with IAM.91 The
court held that under the plain meaning of the statute, the defendant did not exceed her
authorized access because in her capacity as a Secretary-treasurer, she was given permission to
access the membership list and IAM did not terminate her authorization at any point.92
The Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka also rejected the agency approach
followed by Citrin and Shurgard and instead applied an objective standard.93 In Brekka the
employer accused the employee, Christopher Brekka (“Chris”), of e-mailing confidential
company data to his personal e-mail account.94 The court affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employee because he was authorized to use
LVRC’s computers while he was employed at LVRC and therefore he could not have accessed a
computer “without authorization” when he emailed documents to himself prior to leaving
LVRC.95 The court also held that the employee did not “exceed authorized access” because he
was entitled to obtain the documents.96
The proponents of the “narrow view” set out several rationales as to why “authorization”
should be interpreted narrowly in employer-employee misappropriation cases. First, the CFAA’s
silence as to the meaning of “authorization” compels the court to start with the plain meaning of
the statute and its terms.97 The court stated, “it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction”
that when a statute does not define a particular term, words will be interpreted in their “ordinary,
90

Id.
Id. at 495.
92
Id. at 499.
93
581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009).
94
Id. at 1129.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1132
91

contemporary, common meaning.”98 The court looked to the dictionary definition of
authorization and concluded that it is defined as “permission or power granted by an authority”99
and authorize means “to endorse, empower, justify, permit by or as if by some recognized or
property authority.”100 Based on this definition, the court concluded that an employer grants an
employee “authorization” to access a company computer when the employer gives the employee
permission to use it.101
Second, the rule of lenity and canon of avoiding absurd results favor a narrow
construction of the CFAA.102 The rule of lenity states that courts should resolve any ambiguity
in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant.103 The Supreme Court has warned against
interpreting criminal statutes in unanticipated and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on
defendants.104 Since employees would have no reason to know that making personal use of a
company computer is a breach of a “fiduciary duty of loyalty” to an employer it would be
improper for courts to interpret the CFAA in such an unanticipated manner.105 Moreover, the
rule of lenity applies in the civil context because when a statute has “both criminal and
noncriminal application, courts must interpret both contexts consistently.”106 Courts have also
found that reading agency principles into the CFAA may hand down potentially absurd results
therefore the narrow interpretation is a more sensible approach.107 The Lockheed court noted
that reading agency principles into the CFAA will give employers a federal cause of action
whenever employees access the company computer with “adverse interests” and accidentally
98

Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
Id. at 1133(quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 139 (2001)).
100
Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 146 (2002)).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1134.
103
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
104
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (citing United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 513 (2008)).
105
Id. at 1135.
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Id.
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Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 at 7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
99

cause some type of damage or loss.108 It is common for employers to routinely use “protected
computers” with adverse interests unrelated to an employer’s business throughout the workday109
whether it be checking the weather, news, sports, or their Facebook. These types of activities, if
done without permission and accidentally causing damage, may give rise to CFAA liability
under the broad agency interpretation of “authorization.”110
Third, the legislative history and congressional intent support a finding of narrow
construction.111 Congress initially enacted the CFAA to create a cause of action against
computer hackers.112 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has stated
that “Congress was endeavoring to outlaw computer hacking and electronic trespassing [and] not
providing a new means of addressing the unfaithful employee [misappropriation] situations.”113
Furthermore, in 1986 Congress amended the CFAA to narrow the sweep of the statute by
removing one of the “murkier grounds of liability, under which a person’s access to
computerized data might be legitimate in [one] circumstance, but criminal in [another nearly
identical] circumstance.”114 The amendment eliminated any reference to a defendant’s purpose
for accessing information, and instead focused solely on access.115 Also, the Senate reports
emphasize that Congress was more concerned with “outsiders” such as computer hackers rather
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than “insiders” such as employees when passing the CFAA.116 Therefore, it is clear that
Congress intended to eliminate hacking instead of regulating or monitoring an employee’s
subsequent use of computer data after initial access is granted.117
Lastly, the proponents of the narrow view cite that efficient judicial administration
requires courts to interpret the CFAA narrowly.118 A broad interpretation of the CFAA places an
undue burden on the federal court system because it forces them to resolve cases brought by
employers against employees, suits which are traditionally within the province of state courts. 119
Furthermore, because of the federal courts supplemental jurisdiction they will also have to hear
derivative claims related to the CFAA claim arising from the same case or controversy and
therefore cause the federal system to be both inefficient and expensive to maintain.120
The narrow view has very few criticisms noted in court opinions because it is a more
sensible and clear approach to the interpretation of the CFAA. However, one major criticism is
that the narrow view does not provide the flexibility to combat the ever-evolving world of
computer crimes.121 Taking the more narrow approach of “authorization” would preclude courts
to find liability in the infrequent circumstances that may warrant it.122 Furthermore, the narrow
view would preclude many suits arising from disloyal employees for the sole benefit of reducing

116

Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
Id.
118
Id. at 967.
119
Id.
120
See Sarah Boyer, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 6 Rutgers J. L. & Pub. Pol’y
661, 662 (“The issues of ‘unauthorized use’ or ‘damage or loss’…should be construed narrowly’ in order to keep the
claims out of federal court. Otherwise the courts will be overrun with claims by employers against former
employees.”).
121 United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009).
122
Id.
117

the federal case load.123 This could potentially eliminate the benefit of a uniform body of law in
the disloyal employee scenarios.124
C. The Contract-Based Approach and its Limitations
The First Circuit in United States v. Czubinski used the contract-based approach in
interpreting the term “authorization.”125 The defendant Czubinski was employed as a Contact
Representative for the Taxpayer Services Division of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 126
To perform his duties as an employee he would regularly access information from the IRS’s
computer database which included looking at individuals’ private income tax return
information.127 The IRS’s Rules of Conduct, which was signed by Czubinski, clearly stated that
employees who had passwords and access codes were not allowed to access files outside the
course of their official duties.128 He knowingly disregarded IRS rules by looking at confidential
information obtained by performing unauthorized searches outside the scope of his duties.129 An
internal IRS audit revealed that Czubinski accessed information regarding: the joint tax return of
an assistant district attorney who had been prosecuting Czubinski’s father on an unrelated felony
offense and his wife; tax returns of two individuals involved in the David Duke presidential
campaign; and the tax return of a woman Czubinski had dated a few times; and tax returns of
other various individuals.130 However, the government admitted that he did not do “anything
more than knowingly disregard IRS rules by observing the confidential information he accessed”
because he never used the data.131 At trial, a jury convicted Czubinski of violating 18 U.S.C.
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§1030 (a)(4) that required that he access the computer either without authorization or in excess
of authorization, and obtain something of value.132 The court agreed that Czubinski exceeded his
authorized access, which the IRS rules of conduct clearly outlined, but reversed his conviction
because he did not deprive the IRS of any property of value when he exceeded his
authorization.133 While the court may have dismissed his convictions, the holding supports the
proposition that employers are able to “contractually define the limits of authority,” and courts
can use these contracts to determine whether an individual has surpassed his authorized
access.134 More importantly, the First Circuit concluded its discussion with a warning of the
CFAA’s terms and the inherent danger it presents because “[Czubinski’s conduct], although
offensive to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot reasonably be expected to
form the basis of a federal felony.”135
Twelve years later the federal district court in United States v. Drew136 reiterated this
vagueness warning. This case raises the real possibility that the Supreme Court may choose to
rule on the vagueness in the CFAA for the first time to provide some clarity for the future. Lori
Drew, an adult resident of O’Fallon, Missouri, allegedly created a conspiracy to intentionally
access a computer used in interstate commerce without and or in excess of authorization in order
to obtain information for the purpose of committing the tortious act of intentional infliction of
emotional distress upon a 13-year old girl named Megan Meier through the social networking
website MySpace.137 Megan was a classmate of Lori Drew’s daughter, Sarah.138 Pursuant to the
conspiracy, the conspirators established a profile for a fictitious 16 year old male named “Josh
132
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Evans” on the website www.myspace.com.139 The conspirators also posted a photo of a boy on
this website without that boy’s knowledge or consent.140 The conduct violated the terms of
service of the MySpace website which prohibited providing information that the user knew was
false or misleading.141 The website also prohibited including a photograph of another person
without that person’s consent.142 Lori Drew and the other conspirators contacted Megan through
the “Josh Evan” fake profile and flirted with her for several days.143 Later, “Josh” informed
Megan that he was moving and told her “he no longer liked her” and that “the world would be a
better place without her.”144 Megan committed suicide after reading that message.145 After
learning that Megan had killed herself, Lori Drew quickly deleted the “Josh Evans” Myspace
profile.146
The prosecutor charged Lori Drew with one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§371 and three counts of violating a felony portion of the CFAA which prohibits accessing a
computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining information from a
protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or foreign communication and the
offense is committed in furtherance of a crime or tortious act.147 At the beginning of the court’s
opinion, it noted that nothing in the legislative history of the CFAA suggests that Congress
envisioned a cyberbullying prosecution under the statute.148 Judge Wu of the Central District of
California addressed the central issue raised by Drew: whether a computer user’s intentional
violation of one or more provision in an Internet website’s terms of service satisfies the first
139
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element of the CFAA’s section 1030(a)(2)(C): whether the defendant intentionally accessed a
computer either without authorization or in excess of their authorization.149 Judge Wu noted that
three important terms are not sufficiently defined within the first element: “intentionally,”
“access a computer”, and “without authorization” and that the latter two terms have caused
considerable amount of controversy as to their meaning.150 More importantly the court noted
that the interpretation of the term “without authorization” has taken a number of different
approaches in the federal court system including the agency approach, the broad approach and
the contract based approach.151 Judge Wu chose to examine “without authorization” in the
breach of contract context where most courts have held that an intentional or conscious violation
of a website’s terms of service will render the access unauthorized.152 Under this interpretation,
the court held “that an intentional breach of the [MySpace Terms of Service] can potentially
constitute accessing the MySpace computer/server without authorization and/or in excess of
authorization under the statute” satisfying the first element of Section 1030(a)(2)(C).153 Drew’s
ruling is consistent with other cases such as EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zerfer Corp.,154 which has
held that “a lack of authorization could be established by an explicit statement on the website
restricting access.”155
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After the court established that Drew’s conscious violation of the MySpace Terms of
Service constituted a violation under the CFAA, the next issue was whether the CFAA
withstands the void-for-vagueness doctrine.156 The void-for-vagueness doctrine has two prongs:
(1) the offense must have “relatively clear guidelines” so an ordinary person can understand what
conduct is illegal; and (2) the law must give some minimal “objective criteria” to assist law
enforcement agencies in its application.157 The court, quoting Justice Holmes, observed that, as
to criminal statutes, there is a “fair warning” requirement:
“Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law
before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear.158
Judge Wu concluded that basing a CFAA violation upon the conscious violation of a website’s
terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, because of the absence of
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and because of actual notice deficiencies.159
The court states four arguments to conclude that the CFAA neither explicitly states nor
implicitly suggests that breaches of contract are criminalized.160 First, the language contained in
the CFAA does not explicitly state that the CFAA has “criminalized breaches of contract” in the
context of website terms of service.161 Normal breaches of contract are not subject to criminal
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prosecution.162 Therefore, “ordinary people” may expect to be exposed to civil claims for
violating a contractual provision but they would not expect criminal prosecution.163 Second,
Section 1030 is ambiguous in explaining which violations if any constitute unauthorized
access.164 The court found that if any conscious breach of a website’s terms of service is
sufficient to establish a violation of the CFAA, the law would afford too much discretion to the
police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the Internet.165 Third, by allowing website
owners to define when a CFAA violation occurs will ultimately put the website owners in the
position of the “lawmaker” which will only lead to further vagueness problems.166 For example,
the MySpace Terms of Service prohibits its members from posting in “band and filmmaker
profiles…sexually suggestive imagery or any other unfair…[c]ontent intended to draw traffic to
the profile.”167 It is unclear from this provision what “sexually suggestive imagery” and “unfair
content” means or entails.168 Finally, a level of indefiniteness arises when applying contract law
in general and/or other contractual requirements within the applicable terms of service to any
criminal prosecution.169 For example, the MySpace Terms of Service included an arbitration
clause for “any dispute” arising between the service provider and a visitor/member/user. 170
Therefore, before a breach of a term of service can be found or the ability of MySpace to
terminate the visitor/member/user’s access to the site can be determine, the issue would be
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subject to arbitration.171 This would raise the question as to whether a finding of breach of
authorization can be made without arbitration.172
The Drew decision is significant because it recognizes the limitations of the CFAA. The
result of the opinion is a blow to the prosecutors who were desperate to charge Drew with
anything following the public outrage the story generated. The decision was a good one because
turning Terms of Service breaches into a federal crime could have potentially opened a
Pandora’s box of prosecution for even trivial matters and would convert innocent Internet users
into misdemeanant criminals.
III.

Proposal: Courts Should Apply the Rule of Lenity to Resolve Ambiguity

This article displays how absurd the results are between Federal courts attempting to
interpret the CFAA. Until the circuit split gets resolved or Congress decides to amend the statute,
the courts should apply the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant.173
The rule of lenity rests upon two foundations. First, it is founded on the fundamental
principle that no citizen should be subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.174
Accordingly, “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”175 Second, the rule
rests on the principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
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department.176 Quite simply, within our constitutional framework the legislative power,
including the power to define criminal acts and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon
those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress.177
The rule of lenity, however, only applies if after reviewing all sources of legislative
intent, a statute remains ambiguous.178 The Supreme Court has also stated that “[t]he rule of
lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no
more than a guess as to what Congress intended. To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there
is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.”179 Many critics have stated the CFAA is ambiguous
because it was poorly written from the beginning. Also, most judges attempting to interpret the
statue would agree that the CFAA is very unclear and vague. This article has proved that there
is certainly some irreconcilable ambiguity in interpreting the terms “without authorization” and
“exceeds authorization”. Therefore, courts should apply a more consistent and clear approach to
these terms by applying the rule of lenity.
IV.

Conclusion

Congress originally enacted the CFAA as a criminal statute to combat the growing threat
of computer hackers. The pivotal point of many federal court decisions are on the terms
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorization”. Most courts interpret these two terms
using the broad view, the narrow view, or the contract-based approach. The CFAA’s ambiguity
has led to absurd results. Since the CFAA is primarily a criminal statute and since it creates both
civil and criminal liability for violators, courts should apply principles of strict construction of
criminal laws to interpret the statute.
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